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The thesis examines the relationship between the United States and Portugal with special 
attention to the past, present, and potential future utilization of Lajes Field Air Base, the 
sole military asset in Portugal that has historically been highly valued by the United 
States. In the last decade, global events have set U.S. geopolitical interests pivoting 
toward the Asia-Pacific. The post-Cold War re-alignment of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization and recent U.S. budgetary limitations have placed constraints on the U.S. 
Air Force’s mission capability. Lajes Field Air Base, located in the Azores archipelago, 
was not spared from these budgetary cuts. The U.S. Air Force made cuts in manning and 
logistical assets at Lajes Field in order to save millions annually. This thesis evaluates the 
impact of these reductions on Lajes Field Air Base’s mission. The thesis also assesses the 
implications of these reductions for the social, political, and economic bonds between the 
United States and Portugal, particularly the autonomous government of the Azores. 
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It has been 24 years since Karl J. Van Deusen submitted his thesis entitled 
“U.S.−Portuguese Relations and Foreign Base Rights in Portugal.”1 Many new 
developments have intervened since his original thesis. Some issues presented in his 
thesis have been resolved or mitigated while others have produced new mission 
requirements. Mission-related issues, including reductions of forces and responsibilities 
at Lajes Field Air Base, continue to be a concern today, much as was the case 24 years 
ago. 
The importance of this thesis resides in the potential impact of U.S. military 
budget cuts on the mission of Lajes Field Air Base and the relationship between the 
United States and Portugal. These implications might not have been considered initially, 
when the decision was made by the U.S. Air Force to reduce its forces and facilities at 
Lajes Field Air Base. The relationship between the United States and Portugal has been a 
balanced one with geostrategic gains for the United States and with enhanced military 
power projection in a remote territory for Portugal. 
Historically, the political-military relationship between the United States and 
Portugal has been healthy. This political-military relationship dates back to the United 
States Continental Congress, which utilized the Azores to coordinate the travel of 
emissaries who were recruiting support for the U.S. War of Independence (1775–1783). 
The Azores also have the distinction of hosting the oldest continuously operating U.S. 
Consulate, which started in 1795. Portugal was a reliable U.S. ally during World War I 
and changed its initial stance as a neutral country in World War II in order to facilitate 
U.S. troop and equipment movements through the Azores. 
Since it was first constructed, Lajes Field Air Base’s main mission has been to 
refuel military aircraft flying to and from Europe. Currently, Lajes Field Air Base can 
                                                 
1 Karl Van Deusen, “U.S.-Portuguese Relations and Foreign Base Rights in Portugal” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 1990). 
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store over 65 million gallons of jet propulsion fuel in its tank farm.2 Lajes Field is the 
U.S. Air Force’s largest fuel repository in Europe and is the second largest in overseas 
bases, second only to Guam Air Force Base in the Pacific.3 The reduction in forces will 
shrink the window of refueling opportunity for any U.S., North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), or coalition aircraft passing over the Atlantic Ocean from a 24/7 
window, to an eight-hour, seven-days a week window.4 The limited time available for 
aircraft to land and refuel at Lajes Field will make sortie planning more difficult for U.S. 
and NATO forces and for possible future coalition partners. 
This thesis assesses whether the financial savings derived from reducing forces 
and facilities at Lajes Field Air Base will be beneficial in the long run for the U.S. Air 
Force and U.S. security interests. The thesis addresses three important problems. First, as 
noted above, the reduction of forces at Lajes Field will diminish the mission capability of 
the Air Base Wing. The number of U.S. Air Force personnel at Lajes Field Air Base is 
commensurate to the number employed at any other small U.S. Air Force base. A 
common but mistaken impression is to think that Lajes Field Air Base is an American 
base; in fact, it is not. The U.S. 65
th
 Air Base Wing is hosted by the Portuguese Air Force, 
which has command over the Portuguese Air Base No. 4. (Lajes Field Air Base is located 
within Portuguese Air Base No. 4.) The primary military asset of Lajes Field Air Base is 
its runway, so the maintenance of the operability of the runway is the top priority for the 
Lajes Field Air Base leadership. The reduction of forces, as indicated previously, will 
degrade the availability of the runway from a 24-hour schedule to an eight-hour 
schedule.5 The restricted window of opportunity will cause scheduling constraints for 
U.S. and NATO sorties flying over the Atlantic Ocean. The reduction of forces will also 
include billets for military police, which augment the Portuguese military police in 
                                                 
2 Marcus McDonald, “Team Lajes Offloads Fuel for the Fight,” 65th Air Base Wing Public Affairs, 
April 19, 2007, http://www.lajes.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123049530. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Chris Bargery, “Lajes Field Transition” (unpublished power point, 65th Air Base Wing, Lajes Field 
Air Base, Terceira Island, Azores, August 8, 2013), 1−17. 
5 Ibid. 
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securing the perimeter of the base. The shortage of U.S. security forces will put an extra 
burden on the Portuguese Air Force to provide physical security for the base. 
The second problem arising from the U.S. force reductions is the damage to 
U.S.−Portuguese relations. The reduction of forces will affect the local hire employees. 
The burden of over 300 Portuguese nationals on unemployment or retirement will be 
placed directly on Portugal’s struggling economy. Approximately 300 U.S. facilities, 
which have been kept up well by U.S. forces, are also designated to be given back to the 
Portuguese government.6 The Portuguese government has no capability to maintain such 
facilities, which were constructed to meet U.S. specifications, such as a 110 volt 
electricity supply and U.S. sewage and water systems. These issues cause strain on 
U.S.−Portuguese relations. Under the technical agreement signed by both countries in 
1995 any facility not needed by U.S. forces would be demolished, and the land on which 
the facility was built would be given back to the Portuguese government in the same state 
in which it was received.7 Thus, if the Portuguese government were to only accept 
cleared plots of land from the U.S. Air Force, the logistical and monetary costs would be 
immediately counterproductive to the initial cost cutting measures proposed.  
Finally, the third and last problem is the impact of the reduction on NATO forces. 
The deactivation of the Joint Force Command Lisbon (JFCL) headquartered in Oeiras, 
Portugal, in December 2012, nullified Portugal’s operational scope within its primary 
area of interest, the Iberian Peninsula. The relocation of the Naval Striking and Support 
Forces NATO (STRIKFORNATO) from Naples to Oeiras, Portugal, in 2012, and the 
decision in 2012 to relocate the NATO Communications and Information Systems School 
(NCISS) from Latina, Italy, to Oeiras, Portugal, validated NATO’s realignment as a 
result of the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon. Once the Cold War ended, NATO and U.S. 
forces realigned their power projection missions to include closures of NATO commands 
and U.S. military missions. Portugal’s Air Base No.4 and Lajes Field Air Base lost their 
status as key elements in monitoring and protecting the Iberian Peninsula, due to the 
                                                 
6 Bargery, “Transition,” 3. 
7 Department of State, Agreement on Cooperation and Defense between the United States of America 
and Portugal, Technical Agreement (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1995). 
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closure of the JFCL and the termination of the U.S. Navy’s Mid-Atlantic submarine 
monitoring mission.  
An important document supporting this analysis is a Naval Postgraduate School 
thesis written by Karl J. Van Deusen.
8
 The thesis, entitled “U.S.−Portuguese Relations 
and Foreign Base Rights in Portugal,”9 is a detailed quantitative case study of relations 
between the United States and Portugal with an emphasis on foreign basing rights. While 
Van Deusen’s thesis was completed in June 1990, it retains considerable relevance 24 
years later. In Van Deusen’s words, 
This thesis suggests that Portugal’s apparent move toward closer 
alignment with Europe does not preclude the possibility of greater U.S.-
Portuguese cooperation in the social, cultural, economic, political, and 
military fields. Despite the perceived decrease in the Soviet threat, 
enhanced U.S.-Portuguese relations are as important now, if not even 
more, than in the past.
10
 
Van Deusen was aware of the importance that Portugal and the Azores had in the 
geopolitical interests of the United States, and he emphasized the importance of 
cultivating U.S. and NATO relations with Portugal. The historical chapter in Van 
Deusen’s thesis complements further chapters by linking Portugal’s colonial Ultramar 
war in 1968–1974 with its newly democratized government’s hesitance to modernize its 
military. Portugal still possesses a modest military establishment with dated military 
assets. Van Deusen’s thesis also covers Portugal’s rising economy up to 1990, which 
does not compare to today’s struggling economy. 
Van Deusen’s astute deductions about the continual flux in Western assessments 
of the Soviet Union’s behavior within the timeframe of his thesis remain relevant today 
with regard to Russia. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 has given NATO 
Allies and other countries grounds for concern. Developments such as the Crimea 
annexation and Russia’s continuing interventions in Ukrainian politics highlight the 
importance of reviewing and reinforcing military and political bonds with U.S. allies in 
                                                 
8 Deusen, “U.S.−Portuguese.” 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., 5. 
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NATO. Portugal’s status as a founding member of NATO, after having been a Western 
ally through World War I and II, should give it historical credibility to receive continuing 
U.S. support. 
Historical references to Lajes Field Air Base are an important aspect of this thesis. 
Historical accounts specifically dealing with Lajes Field Air Base delineate the 
importance of the base in relation to significant historical events. The book by Manuel 
Martins entitled Base Aerea das Lajes (contribuicao para a sua historia) Lajes Air Base
11
 
specifically deals with the historical events associated with the base. Martins describes in 
great detail historical events in which Lajes Field Air Base was a central player or 
contributor to the success of U.S. and NATO missions. 
The Agreement on Cooperation and Defense between the United States of 
America and Portugal
12
 has been carefully analyzed for its relevance. The agreement 
clarifies key elements of U.S.−Portuguese cooperation. The provisions concerning 
“Cooperation with the Autonomous Region of the Azores” and “Facilities on Portuguese 
Territory” are among the more relevant articles of the document which have direct 
bearing on the thesis.  
Bruno Cardoso Reis’s book chapter on Portugal’s strategic culture includes a 
section entitled “Level of Ambition: A Modest but Global Role in Robust Alliances.”13 
His chapter provides a current viewpoint of Portugal’s determination to rebuild its 
military capabilities into a malleable force that is more compatible with current NATO 
and EU capabilities.
14
 Portugal wants its military capabilities to back up its foreign 
policy, but cannot fully reach this capability without its allies. The economic constraints 
that Portugal faced in 2010, when its economic performance dropped severely, still linger 
today, making Portugal’s contributions to NATO and the EU secondary in comparison 
                                                 
11 Manuel Martins, Base Aerea das Lajes (Contribuição Para a Sua Historia) [Lajes Air Base 
(Contribution to its History)] (Azores, Portugal: Tipografia Açor, Lda., 2006). 
12 Department of State, Agreement on Cooperation and Defense between the United States of America 
and Portugal (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1995), 1–7. 
13 Bruno Cardoso Reis, “Portugal,” in Strategic Cultures in Europe: Security and Defense Policies 
Across the Continent, ed. Heiko Biehl, Bastian Giegerich, and Alexandra Jonas (281–291) (Wiesbaden, 
Germany: Springer Fachmedien, 2013). 
14 Ibid., 290. 
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with certain other allies. One of the more important sections of Reis’s study is entitled 
“Foreign Policy Orientation: A Euro-Atlantic State and Lusophone Nation.”15 Reis’s 
chapter describes a common concern that Portugal and Europe have regarding U.S. 
efforts to promote a “global NATO.”16 The perception of NATO as a global force may 
provoke a negative interpretation of U.S. foreign policy toward Europe. The United 
States has already started a pivot in strategic policy toward the Asia-Pacific, but it has 
also re-affirmed its commitments to its European allies after Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea.  
This thesis consists of five main chapters, with this introduction as Chapter I and 
the conclusion being Chapter V. The second chapter of the thesis provides a historical 
review of relations between the United Kingdom and Portugal, with a specific reference 
to the importance of the alliance between the two countries, which eventually gave way 
to the United States’ efforts to achieve basing rights in the Azores. The third chapter of 
the thesis offers a more detailed look at the strategic importance of Lajes Field Air Base 
in successfully achieving the United Kingdom and United States military missions, which 
later expanded to NATO and allied missions. 
The fourth chapter of the thesis analyzes the periods of reduction at Lajes Field 
Air Base, from the end of World War II to the end of the Cold War era, and the 2012 
United States announcement of the reduction of forces. The chapter also touches on the 
“end goal” of the reduction of forces and equipment, the current status of the reduction, 
and the strategic and logistical obstacles in reaching the reduction goal for Lajes Field Air 
Base. The chapter considers the role of U.S. Congressmen with Portuguese heritage and 
the influence they have had in impeding the force and mission reductions at Lajes Field 
Air Base. 
The fifth and final chapter describes the actions that have been taken to mitigate 
the impact on the local and national economy of the Lajes Field Air Base reductions. This 
chapter also speculates on alternative solutions to prevent the reduction of forces or the 
                                                 
15 Reis, “Portugal,” 284−287. 
16 Ibid., 285. 
 7 
modification of mission parameters in order to sustain or enhance current operational 
capability. The chapter also presents an overall summary of the thesis and ideas for the 
possible future missions of Lajes Field Air Base. 
  
 8 
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II. PORTUGUESE HISTORY AND TIES WITH THE UNITED 
KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES 
This chapter of the thesis focuses on Portugal’s long-standing alliance with 
England, since 1707 the United Kingdom. This chapter focuses on the effectiveness of 
this long lasting alliance and how throughout history, both Portugal and the United 
Kingdom have maintained their commitments all the way to the twenty-first century. 
The first dated alliance between Portugal and England was in 1373. However, the 
official date most historians acknowledge as the ratified alliance between Portugal and 
England was May 1386, since this date marked the wedding of King John I of Portugal 
and Philippa of Lancaster, daughter of John of Gaunt, the first Duke of Lancaster, sealing 
the Treaty of Windsor.17 This treaty holds true as the oldest alliance in the world, which 
is still active. Throughout history the alliance at some points was purposely forgotten or 
conveniently put aside, but never severed. 
This chapter provides a review of Portugal’s beginnings, the English and 
Portuguese Empires, and the strategic importance of the alliance and at times its 
abandonment. The chapter ends with a conclusion assessing the importance that Portugal 
has had in helping the United Kingdom maintain its global power. Though the alliance 
between Portugal and England was officially founded in 1386, the two countries had 
crossed paths before. The treaty solidified the bond between the countries and eventually 
marked the mutual solidarity with a notable marriage and alliance. 
A. PORTUGAL AND ITS BEGINNINGS 
The friendship between England and Portugal was seeded on the battleground of 
Portugal’s birth. Martin Page states, 
Lisbon had been effectively closed to north Europeans for almost 400 
years. The knights’ chaplain described it as beyond the boundaries of the 
                                                 
17 Thomas Earle, “Portugal and England, 1386–2010: A Complex Web of Political Economic and 
Intellectual Relations,” University of Oxford, 2010, http://www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-
events/portugal-and-england-1386-2010. 
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known world, at the southern extremity of the Atlantic Ocean. The city 
was reputed to be ‘the richest in trade of all Africa and most of Europe.’18 
In 1147, the King of Portugal, Afonso Henriques, was forwarding his campaign to 
solidify his kingdom. In that year King Henriques set his goals toward capturing the city 
of Lisbon, which at that time had over 150,000 men. Compared to Paris, which then had 
about 50,000,19 Lisbon was the megacity of a still adolescent Europe. King Henriques 
was at a military disadvantage. Lisbon was located on a hill and adjacent to a river, 
making it difficult for any army to besiege it. While King Henriques tried to besiege the 
city of Lisbon, English and Norman crusaders in route to the Holy Land to start the 
Second Crusade campaign stopped in Portugal due to inclement weather. As the 
crusaders restocked their boats, a bishop came to them and requested their help on behalf 
of the Portuguese king.20 The crusaders saw the wealth that Lisbon had and said that they 
would only fight for Portugal if after their victory they could plunder Lisbon with none of 
the riches to be given to the Portuguese. Page quotes King Henrique’s speech, as follows:  
Who are about to remain with me at the siege of the City of Lisbon may 
take into their own power and possession, and may keep, all the 
possessions of the enemy. Myself and all my men shall have absolutely no 
share in them. If perchance they should take the city, they shall have it and 
hold it until it has been searched and despoiled. After it has been 
ransacked to their full satisfaction, they shall hand it over to me.21 
The city of Lisbon was overtaken, and all its spoils were taken and divided among 
the English, the Normans, and the Germans. Portugal had conquered its future capital, 
and the Crusaders had reached their most successful point of their crusade, since the 
Second Crusade was tragic from that event on.22 
                                                 
18 Martin Page, The First Global Village: How Portugal Changed the World (Alfragide, Portugal: 
Casa das Letras, 2011), 74. 
19 Ibid., 75. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Henriques quoted in Page, First Global Village, 75. 
22 Ibid., 78−9. 
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B. THE BRITISH AND PORTUGUESE EMPIRES 
With the help of the English (and others), Portugal conquered the city of Lisbon, a 
key territory and eventually the capital of its kingdom. The year 1147 was not to be the 
last time Portugal and England would combine their armies in combat. In the Seven 
Years’ War (1756–1763), Britain fought alongside Portugal when Spain decided to 
invade Portugal. The Seven Years’ War began with the great powers, including Great 
Britain, fighting against France. Portugal and Spain were designated neutral countries 
during the Seven Years’ War. Towards the end of the war, however, Spain invaded 
Portugal, and each country requested the assistance of its natural ally. Portugal depended 
on Great Britain and Spain on France as an ally.  
During the Napoleonic Wars (1803–1815), Portugal continued its trade with the 
United Kingdom, even under French restrictions. This led to French forces invading 
Portugal.23 France’s and Spain’s actions against Portugal gave rise to the Peninsular War 
(1807–1814). The United Kingdom’s military, led by the first Duke of Wellington, Sir 
Arthur Wellesley, came to Portugal’s side once more and helped the country regain its 
sovereignty and independence.24 When France turned on Spain, Wellesley took 
advantage of having the Spanish on his side, and pushed forth into Spain to repel the 
French forces.25 
C. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE ALLIANCE 
The twentieth century brought more situations in which the United Kingdom and 
Portugal had to align their forces. On March 9, 1916, during World War I, Germany 
declared war on Portugal. Antonio Costa Pinto elaborates on this issue as follows: 
The [Portuguese] Republicans had unanimously supported participation in 
the Great War, in the belief that it would guarantee the safety of the 
African colonies. But because Britain seemed prepared to “give” Germany 
some of those colonies, the [Portuguese] Democratic Party concluded that 
neutrality was dangerous, and became the greatest champion of military  
                                                 
23 Charles Esdaile, “The Peninsular War: A Review of Recent Literature,” Historian, no. 64 (Winter 




participation on the European front. The Democrats believed, furthermore, 
that Portuguese participation in the peace negotiations would consolidate 
the country’s international position.26 
Portuguese troops fought alongside British soldiers on the Western Front. Fifty-five 
thousand Portuguese troops were deployed in Europe, and of those 35,000 were killed or 
wounded.27 
When World War II came about, Portugal was persuaded by the United Kingdom 
to establish a strategic allied base in the Azores for the benefit of British and American 
forces. The base became a key asset to allied nations, particularly the United Kingdom 
and the United States. 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill had first to ask the British Parliament for 
support in asking for Portugal’s permission to build and utilize a base in the Azores. 
Prime Minister Churchill stated, 
His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, basing themselves 
upon this ancient Alliance, have now requested the Portuguese 
Government to accord them certain facilities in the Azores which will 
enable better protection to be provided for merchant shipping in the 
Atlantic. The Portuguese Government have agreed to grant this request, 
and arrangements, which enter into force immediately.28 
Churchill concluded his speech to the House of Commons by saying, 
I take this opportunity of placing on record the appreciation by His 
Majesty’s Government, which I have no doubt is shared by Parliament and 
the British nation, of the attitude of the Portuguese Government, whose 
loyalty to their British Ally never wavered in the darkest hours of the 
war.29 
The base in the Azores became a key sub hunting base, as well as a transportation 
hub for the United States to send its troops and equipment across the Atlantic.30 British 
                                                 
26 Antonio Pinto, Modern Portugal (Palo Alto, CA: The Society for the Promotion of Science and 
Scholarship, Inc., 1998), 9. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Winston Churchill, “Agreement with Portugal,” Hansard, 392 (1943): 716−9, House of Commons 
Transcript, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1943/oct/12/agreement-with-portugal. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Page, First Global Village, 239. 
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and U.S. operations from the Azores reduced the level of allied casualties. Page notes the 
distinct relationships the people of the Azores and the people of Portugal had towards the 
United States in World War II and makes clear how popular sentiment influenced 
Salazar’s decision making. 
As well as refusing to stop the tungsten shipments to Germany, Salazar 
had stalled over the allies’ request to set up military bases in the Azores. 
These Portuguese islands were being used by German U-boats as a safe 
haven from which to attack convoys bringing food and other vital supplies 
to Britain. With the help of the U-boats, Hitler had come close to realizing 
his dream of starving the British into defeat. Still Salazar did not budge. 
The Azorian people themselves have long had closer personal links with 
the USA than with mainland Portugal itself. Indeed more Azorians live 
there, than in the Azores themselves. There was no question as to where 
their sympathies lay. A wave of demonstrations on the island demanded 
independence from Portugal. In the summer of 1943, seemingly abruptly, 
Salazar conceded to both the allies’ demands.31 
In 1961, Portugal was at risk of losing one of its important colonies in India. Goa 
was one of Portugal’s oldest and well established colonies. India had negotiated with 
Portugal several times to regain its territory, and those requests were denied. India finally 
decided that it would take Goa back by force.32 As stated by Jagan Pillarisetti, “After 
years of negotiation, in late 1961, the government decided to deploy the armed forces in 
an effort to evict the Portuguese out of Goa and other enclaves. Accordingly in 
November 1961, India made preparations for the same.”33  
Portugal invoked its treaty with London but had little help from the United 
Kingdom. India had already obtained independence from the United Kingdom on August 
15, 1947. The United Kingdom was not keen on antagonizing a former disputed colony. 
Portugal received no assistance from the United Kingdom on this particular occasion. 
The loss of Goa effectively ended Portugal’s 451 year rule in India. Goa was eventually 
annexed by India. 
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On April 2, 1982, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, South Georgia Island, 
and South Sandwich islands. Argentina and the United Kingdom have yet to resolve their 
dispute over possession of these islands. Argentina escalated the debate by invading and 
occupying these British territories.34 This act of war by Argentina drew a quick reaction 
from British forces, which fought to liberate their territory in the South Atlantic Ocean.35 
Portugal offered its ports in the Azores to the Royal Navy in support of Britain’s aims in 
the Falklands War. Britain instead used Ascension Island as a staging point. The 
Falklands War lasted 10 weeks and ended with the United Kingdom regaining its 
territories from Argentina.36 
D. WHEN THE ALLIANCE WAS FORGOTTEN  
While the treaty of alliance was a uniting document, there were times when the 
alliance did not have any bearing on Anglo-Portuguese relations. During the dynastic 
union between Portugal and Spain (1580–1640), King Sebastian died fighting in Morocco 
and left Portugal heirless.37 A grand-uncle of the King took his place on the throne, but 
died two years later. King Philip II of Spain took the Portuguese crown by force, 
justifying his place on the throne by being the grandson of King Manuel I.38 From that 
time forth the alliance between Portugal and England was put on hold. Portugal’s foreign 
policy was forcibly aligned with that of Spain, making England an enemy. During the 
Anglo-Spanish War (1585–1604) Portugal and Britain were by unfortunate circumstances 
put on opposing sides. The Dutch-Portuguese War (1602–1663) brought one more 
conflict that put the Portuguese and British empires in opposition. The Dutch Revolt of 
1566 initiated the pilfering of King Phillip II’s possessions by the Dutch Republic allies, 
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England and France. Since Portugal belonged to Phillip II, it too became a target, even 
for its former ally England.39 
In 1890, the alliance between Portugal and England was again put to the test. 
Portugal was seeking treaties with the Yao chiefs in a territory southeast of Lake Nyasa 
in the Shire Highlands of Africa. This led to Britain sending Portugal an ultimatum in 
which Portugal was asked to retract its forces from disputed areas that the British insisted 
on controlling. Teresa Coelho explains the Ultimatum as follows: 
What is meant by the Ultimatum? It refers to a memorandum sent to the 
Portuguese Government by Lord Salisbury on 11 January 1890. In that 
document he demanded the withdrawal of the Portuguese troops from 
Mashona and Matabeleland (later Rhodesia) and the Shire-Nyasa region 
(Malawi) where Portuguese and British interests in Africa overlapped.40 
Many in Portugal took the ultimatum as an insult. It forced Portugal to 
acknowledge British sovereignty over territory that Portugal had claimed centuries 
before.41 Portugal signed treaties with France and Germany. The German treaty gave 
claim to Portugal on a belt of territory on the Zambezi valley, linking Angola and 
Mozambique. This belt of land was later known as the “Rose Colored Map.”42 Britain did 
not appreciate what Portugal had done and in response protested. The territory Portugal 
had claimed overlapped with Scottish mission settlements in that territory.43 The territory 
also interfered with Cecil Rhodes’ expansion policy.44 Tensions escalated in Africa. Two 
expeditions were sent forth to accomplish the task of coming to an agreement with tribal 
chiefs on the territories designated on the “Rose Colored Map.” In addition, 20 treaties 
with chiefs in what is now Malawi were accomplished. Serpa Pinto was one of the 
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Portuguese leaders charged with leading one of the expeditions. While conducting his 
duties, Pinto met with Henry Hamilton Johnson, the British consul to Mozambique, at a 
river crossing.45 Johnson advised Pinto not to cross the river.46 Little to Pinto’s 
knowledge, Johnson was appointed by the British government to ascertain the strength of 
Portugal’s rule in the Zambezi and Shire valleys.47 Unfortunately, Pinto crossed the Ruo 
to Chiromo, which led to an armed conflict between Pinto’s troops and Johnson’s 
troops.48 This incident was the start of a conflict between Britain and Portugal. 
Portuguese citizens were outraged with the Ultimatum and the armed conflict, and many 
protested in the streets of Lisbon.49 Coelho describes the event in her paper as follows: 
The terms of the Ultimatum aroused violent anti-British sentiments all 
over Portugal. Demonstrations were held, the British consulate stoned and 
economic sanctions against Britain demanded. Advocating Portugal’s 
claims in Africa, the Portuguese press and literature echoed and stimulated 
the reaction against Britain. Journalists, poets, novelists, students and the 
public in general protested violently against what they saw as an 
outrage.50 
While there were initial treaties formulated, either Portugal or Britain did not fully 
agree. However, a treaty signed on June, 11, 1891,51 established the permanent borders 
that are still respected today. There were repercussions from this event. The friendship 
between Portugal and Britain was damaged but not abandoned. In Coelho’s words, 
The Anglo-Portuguese Declaration of 1899 signed on 14 October 1899 
reaffirmed former treaties of Alliance. According to the new treaty, Britain 
committed herself to defend Portuguese colonies from all enemies present 
and future. Portugal agreed to stop the supply of arms through Lourenço 
Marques to the Transvaal and officially declare neutrality in the Anglo-
Boer conflict.52 
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It must be understood that Portugal and Britain at the time of the Ultimatum, were 
connected by royal blood because Don Carlos the King of Portugal was a relative of 
Queen Victoria. Hence, the alliance, while bruised, was not irreparable. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Portugal and the United Kingdom have shared many moments of solidarity and 
rivalry, but as brothers, bonded by an alliance of blood. The two countries were bonded 
by family ties. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the conquest of Lisbon in 
1147 was a key to Portugal’s survival. English troops (among crusaders from other 
countries) where there helping King Henriques fight the Moors. The crusaders were there 
as profiteers on the way to the Holy Land. Portugal had to give all of Lisbon’s wealth to 
secure its country’s new borders. While the treaty of Windsor of 1386 was a symbol of 
good faith between the countries, it became more of an insurance policy for Portugal 
against its ever waiting neighbor Spain and a way for England to keep Portugal within its 
sights, as well as economic opportunities.  
Both countries have for the most part rendered aid to each other when needed. As 
seen in this chapter, the United Kingdom (England) has accepted the greater share of 
risks by taking on opponents of the Portuguese crown, and securing the country’s 
sovereignty for a good part of Portugal’s existence. At the same time the Anglo-
Portuguese alliance has afforded the United Kingdom benefits in trade and commerce 
with Portugal and its possessions. It also gave the England of the fourteenth century a 
navy it could call upon. One can say that the relationship between Portugal and England 
has been symbiotic at best, since it has benefited both countries. The absence of such a 
treaty probably would have put Portugal at more peril of becoming a permanent 
possession of Spain, if it were not for the United Kingdom. In the past, England was an 
island fortress that could not be conquered. The English Channel made a formidable 
obstacle that not even Napoleon could overcome. England’s military strength benefited 
Portugal by protecting it from becoming the target of nearby countries, such as Spain or 
France. These had to think twice on their strategy of conquest, as to avoid fighting with 
the British.  
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The Anglo-Portuguese alliance, while never broken, was abandoned at times. 
With the death of Portugal’s King Sebastian in Mozambique and his predecessor dying 
two years later, Portugal was quickly taken over by Spain. This event unwillingly put 
Portugal at odds with England, due to Spanish rule. The Dutch-Portuguese War 
(1602−1663) was the alliance’s darkest moment. England took full advantage of 
Portugal’s subjugation to Spain. Along with the Dutch, the British took Portuguese 
overseas possessions for their own, inciting armed conflicts between countries and 
outrage among the Portuguese people. As it was in 1386, the Anglo-Portuguese alliance 
is still in full vigor, ready to be utilized either Portugal or the United Kingdom for 




III. THE UNITED STATES, PORTUGAL, AND NATO ALLIANCE 
According to David S. Yost,  
When the Alliance was formed, Portugal was governed by a dictatorship 
little different from that in Spain; but the Azores were too important to the 
security of the Allies in the event of war to let Portugal’s form of 
government pose an obstacle to membership.53 
Supporting Portugal’s membership in NATO was not a normative action, but 
rather an exception to NATO’s democratic values. This chapter of the thesis focuses on 
Portugal and its contributions to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This 
chapter clearly delineates the importance Portugal, the archipelago of Madeira, and the 
archipelago of the Azores has had for NATO. This chapter also explains how these 
regions contributed to the stability, reinforcement, and security of the North Atlantic 
routes to the Straits of Gibraltar for allied operations, and to the refueling of rapid 
deployment forces heading to Central Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. 
The topics covered in this chapter include Portugal before NATO, the United States 
secret second base in the Azores, the role of the Madeira Archipelago and Nazi directive 
No.18, Portugal’s membership in NATO, Portugal’s contributions to NATO after the 
Cold War, and the future of Portugal in NATO and the EU. The chapter concludes with 
an assessment of Portugal’s value as a strategic partner for the NATO Allies. 
A. PORTUGAL BEFORE NATO 
Since Portugal’s creation, it has had a rich and eventful history. Portugal has 
influenced global trends, as well as having contributed to the activities of other global 
powers. The strategic value of one of its discoveries—the Azores (nine islands, 900 miles 
off the coast of Portugal)—was even appreciated by Christopher Columbus, on his way 
back from discovering the New World. Columbus resupplied his ships at one of the 
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Azorean islands called Santa Maria and continued on to Europe.54 The Azores have been 
a stopover point or safe haven for countless maritime navigators. With the development 
of aviation and its initial limitations, the Azores became a natural stopover for most early 
aviators.55 In the twentieth century, Portugal’s military strategic value was noted long 
before the establishment of NATO. In 1918, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy at that time, visited the Azores and supervised the 
dismantling of World War I United States naval facilities, which were located on two of 
the nine islands.56 Roosevelt also gave notice of the geographical importance of the 
islands as a viable control point for securing the Atlantic Ocean.57 Once World War II 
started, future members of NATO, particularly the United States and Britain, knew the 
distinct strategic advantages of having allied military bases in the Azores, and the 
definitive impact they would have on the war as a whole. Unfortunately, Portugal had 
been a fascist country since the early 1930s and was neutral when World War II 
commenced. Allied forces were preoccupied about the Atlantic Ocean and its military 
value for whoever secured it. The Atlantic Ocean was a large area which for the most part 
was unprotected from enemy forces. German U-boats were wreaking havoc on the 
transatlantic shipping lanes,58 and the United States needed a quicker way to ship its 
troops and equipment across the Atlantic.  
The geographic location of the Azores islands was ideal for a refueling and 
submarine hunting airbase. In May 1943, a conference between Great Britain and the 
United States, called the Trident Conference, focused on determining how to convince 
Portugal’s Prime Minister Antonio Salazar to allow allied forces a military presence in 
the Azores.59 Britain’s proposal to Portugal included a strategic diplomatic appeal, by 
way of Portugal’s and England’s centuries-long alliance treaties, including the Windsor 
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Treaty of 1373 and the Methuven Treaty of 1703.60 These treaties plus British and United 
States support to facilitate and expedite efforts to surmount the logistical and financial 
constraints of such a proposal, were submitted to Portugal.61 Portugal responded in favor 
of allowing a military presence in the Azores, but with certain stipulations. Portugal’s 
stipulations consisted of assistance from allied forces against possible German air strikes, 
protection from German attacks on Portuguese merchant ships, and provisions to 
guarantee the preservation and restoration of Portuguese colonial territories.62 From 1941 
to 1943 the Portuguese started the initial stages of amassing air assets within the Azores, 
including a landing strip at the future Lajes Field Air Base on Terceira Island in the 
Azores.63 Most of Portugal’s aircraft were composed of World War I airframes. Until the 
British came to the Azores there were minimal air support facilities and a packed dirt 
runway.64  
British forces arrived at Terceira Island in October 1943, and quickly started work 
on a new runway to accommodate future British B-17s. In one month, Lajes Field Air 
Base runway was completed with the assistance of local workers.65 Most local islanders 
lived simple and poor lives. They worked in the fields and were paid minimally. These 
workers eagerly left their jobs to become employees of the Royal Air Force (RAF), since 
the RAF’s salaries were substantially higher than those from farming.66 
On November 9, 1943, a Royal Air Force B-17 sank a German submarine for the 
first time from the Azores. The aircraft took off from the newly assigned allied base 
called Lajes Field Air Base.67 The establishment of an anti-submarine campaign with its 
nucleus in the Azores was truly advantageous to the allied forces. In 1942, German 
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submarine attacks had sunk 5.4 million tons of cargo. By 1943 that number had been 
reduced to 146 thousand tons.68 The proposal to allow American forces to operate from 
the Azores was initiated by the British on December 1, 1943.69 The British signed an 
agreement with the United States, allowing its forces to operate as “technical 
assistants.”70 Nine days after the agreement was signed, the first United States B-17 
landed on Terceira Island. On December 31, 1943, Portugal sent official authorization of 
the agreement.71 With approval from Portugal for British and American forces to operate 
out of Terceira Island, a large scale logistical operation took place to support a great 
number of airframes and maintenance crews. Fuel for the stationed bombers became a 
high priority.72 On January 9, 1944, the United States Navy received authorization for the 
procurement of a port to build a fuel docking facility along with two fuel pipelines, 
connecting the port and Lajes Air Base.73 Large numbers of sailors, with their equipment, 
arrived at the nearby port of Praia da Vitoria, the closest port to Lajes Field Air Base. The 
Navy expediently constructed the fueling port, hardened support facilities, and living 
quarters for the assigned military, as well as two taxiways at Lajes Field Air Base.74  
B. THE AZOREAN SECRET BASE 
The United States Army had established a “technical assistants” military presence 
in the Azores, but was not satisfied with the limited mission scope it had at Lajes Field 
Air Base.75 The socio-political relationship between the United States and Portugal was 
healthy, so the American administration persuaded the Portuguese government to grant 
United States rights to build its own base on a different island.76  
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While negotiations were going on between governments, a secret mission had 
been put into effect. Six military officers went to Washington, DC and received a covert 
mission to accomplish.77 The officers were to survey the island of Santa Maria, under the 
guise of being employees of Pan American Airlines. Portugal gave permission to the 
United States to build a military base on November 28, 1944.78 Both governments agreed 
not to reveal the base’s role as a military asset; rather it would be identified as a civilian 
airport, operating under the Pan American auspices.79 Once built, the base on Santa 
Maria Island was called Station X and the work contract to build it was called Special 
Project 111.80 Even though much work went into approving and building the base and 
keeping it undercover, Station X was short lived with the end of World War II. The end 
of the war and the return of the British forces back to the United Kingdom gave the 
United States an opening to transfer assets from Station X to Lajes Field Air Base, which 
had better equipped facilities and was designed for refueling aircraft.81  
In January 1946, the British returned the base to Portugal. Even though the war 
had ended, Lajes Field Air Base became the initial refueling point for all aircraft that 
made the loop in transporting troops from Europe to the United States.82 On July 10, 
1946, Portugal decided to allow the United States to stay in the Azores on a provisional 
basis and carry on its mission.83 
C. FÜHRER DIRECTIVE NO. 18 
The Führer Directive No. 18 was written in November 1940.84 It was a phased 
plan of attack from the German High Command on how to proceed with the invasions in 
Western Europe, and eventually the capture of Gibraltar, ultimately giving Germany 
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control over the Straits of Gibraltar. Portugal was also a part of Adolf Hitler’s (the 
Führer’s) plan. Portugal was to be invaded, if any British forces occupied its territory. 
The archipelagoes of the Azores and Madeira were also to be seized by Nazi forces, to 
reinforce the closure of the Straits of Gibraltar.85 Due to the high risk of Gibraltar being 
invaded, it was decided that it was to be evacuated. In July 1940, 2,000 Gibraltarians fled 
their country to stay in the Madeira archipelago.86 The Azores had strategic value, as did 
Madeira, by virtue of each archipelago being located in a unique geographical location; 
each had its own advantages in helping the Allies in World War II. 
D. NATO MEMBERSHIP 
World War I and World War II solidified the importance that the Azores and 
Portugal had for the United States’ successful military strategic policy in Europe and 
Northern Africa. Future conflicts within these geographical areas (and beyond) would 
make the bases that the United States already had in the Azores indispensable. 
Unfortunately, the United States was in the late 1940s operating Lajes Field Air Base on 
a provisional status and had abandoned its other base on Santa Maria Island.87 The task at 
hand for the United States was to keep its relationship with Portugal viable and find a 
way to continue operations in the Azores. While non-binding negotiations between the 
United States and Portugal were underway after World War II, world politics brewed on. 
In 1948, the Soviet Union decided to isolate the western part of Berlin, hoping to squeeze 
and eventually annex that territory for its own sphere of influence.88 This meant that 
about two million people became trapped in their own city.89 The United States proposed 
a continuous airlift operation to supply West Berliners with the essentials needed until 
global powers came to a resolution.90 This mission was known as the Berlin airlift or 
Operation Vittles. The mission was a resounding success partially due to the base 
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established in the Azores. Lajes Field Air Base became a support hub for personnel 
coming to and going from the operation.91 Maintenance crews fixed Operation Vittles 
airframes, and over 3,000 aircraft passed through the Azores until the operation ended in 
September 1949.92 
Portugal’s membership in NATO in 1949 became in part a means to an end for 
the United States to keep an operational mission within the Azores. The United States 
ability to operate from the Azores allowed it to project its military interests toward 
Europe and beyond.93 In 1973, when the Yom Kippur War commenced, the United States 
in its efforts to support Israel could not secure a refueling base within NATO countries 
other than Portugal.94 The other members of NATO feared oil embargos from Arab 
suppliers if they were to support the United States and ultimately Israel.95 Portugal was 
the only NATO country willing to allow the United States to refuel aircraft on its soil. 
The U.S. forces operated from Lajes Field Air Base in the Azores. The name of the 
mission was Nickel Grass, and 22.3 thousand tons of cargo were sent to Israel through 
Lajes Field Air Base,96 again showing how important Portugal was to the United States 
and NATO. The support Portugal had from the United States did not prevent Portugal 
from being seen as a colonial empire by the rest of the world.97 Once primary colonies 
such as Angola and Mozambique tried to secede from Portugal starting in the mid-1960s, 
this era marked the beginning of Portugal’s colonial wars. These wars caused friction 
within NATO. Because of Portugal’s inability to resolve its problems with its colonies, it 
was perceived as a catalyst for promoting Soviet subversion within those areas.98  
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Portugal was also pressured by the United Nations to decolonize. Portugal resisted 
and refused to accommodate the United Nations until a non-violent military coup was 
executed on Portugal’s government on April, 25, 1974. Initiated by a handful of Army 
captains, the coup was named the “The Revolution of the Carnations” for being a 
peaceful takeover, and it became one of the most critical events in Portugal’s modern 
history. The coup had important implications for Portugal’s continuation in NATO. 
According to Harold Livermore, 
Political and social instability prevailed through most of 1975. More than 
half a million people fled to Portugal from the former African colonies, 
adding a refugee problem to the already volatile domestic situation; some 
30 persons died in incidents of public violence, new political parties 
proliferated, and strikes were widespread. In 1975 the government also 
decided to nationalize banking, transport, heavy industries, and the 
media.99 
While the “Revolution of the Carnations” marked the end of fascism, it also 
opened the door for new elections in Portugal. NATO knew where it stood with Portugal 
under its dictator’s rule, but had little knowledge of who would be Portugal’s new leader, 
and there was always the possibility of communism receiving a majority vote, putting 
NATO in a difficult situation. Fortunately, Portugal’s first election after its 
decolonization era was secured with a Socialist president and not Communist as 
feared.100 
E. CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATO 
After Portugal’s social and political hardships in the 1970s, its contributions to 
NATO were consistent and unwavering. In 1992 Portugal participated in Operation Sharp 
Vigilance in the Adriatic. Portugal provided one P3-Orion electronics platform aircraft, 
one frigate, one corvette, and a C-130 for logistical support.101 From 1993 to 1995 
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Portugal supported Operations Sharp Fence and Sharp Guard in the Adriatic by 
contributing a frigate, a submarine, and extended auxiliary ships.102 From 1996 to 1997 
Portugal supported the Implementation Force (IFOR) by sending two airborne battalions 
to Bosnia−Herzegovina.103 In 1998–1999, Portugal supported Operation Eagle Eye, and 
Portugal took the mission of performing reconnaissance sorties over the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (FRY).104 In 1999, Operation Allied Force in the FRY was supported by 
Portugal securing its air mission over the FRY.105 In 1999 Portugal supported the Kosovo 
Force (KFOR) under the auspices of Operation Joint Guardian.106 According to Santo,  
The capacity to participate in military operations in crisis management is 
being developed, as part of the Portuguese responsibilities for security and 
defence. The military planning, in what concerns the conception and 
employment of military force, its organization, armament and equipment 
is nowadays more oriented towards the missions that they may have to 
fulfil than to the threat that they may have to face.107 
F. MORE CURRENT MISSIONS AND ISSUES 
On 2003 Portugal hosted the “Atlantic Summit,” which united the Prime 
Ministers of Portugal, Spain and Great Britain with the United States President George 
W. Bush. The summit was held at Lajes Field Air Base and discussed the preliminary 
details of joint intervention in Iraq. Due to the islands’ central location in the Atlantic 
Ocean, and the relative safety that the secluded islands presented, it was a fitting location 
for this event.108 Portugal’s membership in the European Union and its utilization of the 
Euro as its currency aligned it well with Europe’s economic aspirations.109 
Unfortunately, Portugal among a few other European countries did not manage its 
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monetary budget very well, and inevitably fell into a deep recessionary phase.110 Portugal 
was forced to undergo budgetary constraints on just about every aspect of government, 
including military spending. Bruno Reis defines Portugal’s defensive policy as follows: 
The Portuguese official policy was reiterated in the 2010 Defence 
Directive—‘cooperative security,’ emphasizing that the ‘NATO, EU, UN’ 
context is ‘of vital importance’ for Portugal, because ‘national security is 
not defended only at territorial borders’ and this is the best way of making 
‘a contribution towards building a wider security.’111  
In 2013, Portugal continued its participation in the NATO-led operations in 
Afghanistan, as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).112 Portugal’s 
contribution to ISAF included the deployment of 227 military personnel, as well as 14 
members of the National Republican Guard.113 Portugal also deployed six F-16 fighters 
and maintenance personnel to Iceland in support of that country’s air policing efforts.114 
Portugal is also a member of the ongoing Operation Active Endeavour (OAE), a maritime 
operation of integral importance to countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea. OAE 
provides anti-terrorism protection and peace building stability within the Mediterranean 
region.115 Portugal has taken part in OAE in various ways, once with a naval presence in 
the form of military ships. Another contribution was in the air by providing a P3-P sub-
hunter aircraft, and most recently Portugal has deployed one of its submarines in support 
of the OAE mission.116  
Portugal has already projected future missions beyond 2014; its commitment to 
NATO’s role in Afghanistan is unwavering.117 Even though ISAF assets are scheduled to 
leave Afghanistan after 2014, Portugal will continue to support the country in its 
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partnership framework, helping with education and development programs within 
Afghanistan.118 While Portugal has become constrained by its economic woes, it has 
continued to participate in NATO missions and has also started to contribute to EU 
missions.  
G. MULTIPLE FUTURES FOR PORTUGAL 
With Portugal’s entrance into the EU, new possibilities in military partnership 
came to light. Before joining the EU, Portugal was solely dependent on NATO for its 
security alliance.119 The start of the Kosovo war painted a new picture for Portugal. It 
understood that Europe could not depend on the United States to be an active ally in 
every conflict, so it embraced the EU and became a contributor to build the Common 
Security Defense Policy (CSDP).120 Reis states that the “Current Portuguese strategic 
culture shows a strong preference both for robust multilateral normative framework, and 
strong alliances that are regarded as vital, especially for the security interest of small 
countries in a world of globalized threats.”121 By having NATO and EU membership, 
Portugal is hedging its security posture. If Portugal gets entangled in a security issue, it is 
likely to get assistance either from NATO or the EU, each with its unique circumstances 
for justification of assistance. Portugal perceives itself as being in a better position now 
than when it was only working with NATO, but Portugal now has two organizations to 
keep up with. 
H. CONCLUSION 
Portugal in comparison to several other NATO members is a small country. In 
terms of contributions to missions led by NATO, however, Portugal is more active than 
many Alliance members. Reis states that “Portugal today has more military personnel in 
NATO missions (371, 210 thereof in Afghanistan) than in the UN and the European 
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Union (EU) combined (165).”122 In these recent times of austerity, Portugal has been 
forced to reduce its military budget to keep up its commitment with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), commonly referred by the Portuguese as the troika. These 
restrictions in military spending have reduced Portugal’s international military 
capabilities, as well as its national military flexibility. Portugal has also received 
notification that the United States military is in a situation of budgetary austerity and has 
projected a reduction of forces at Lajes Field Air Base.123 These reductions at Lajes Field 
Air Base will save the United States Air Force an estimated 35 million dollars 
annually.124 Needless to say, Portugal did not receive the notification with much glee. 
The United States has only one military asset in Portugal, and that is the 65
th
 Air Base 
Wing, a tenant of its Portuguese host, Air Base No.4. Lajes Field Air Base employs over 
800 local nationals, and has a combined U.S. military and civilian presence of about 
1,200 people.125 The end force structure would bring the local national employee number 
to just above 300 people and the U.S. military presence to around 160 people.126 The 
reduction in forces of Lajes Field Air Base is disconcerting to the Portuguese 
government, since it will have an economic impact on the local region. This is just one 
more issue that Portugal needs to factor into its decision-making as it presses forward to a 
future that is unknown. 
In conclusion, it is apparent that Portugal’s track record within NATO is 
respectable and even commendable. The strategic value of Lajes Field Air Base has 
historically been vital to the United States and NATO’s missions. Portugal’s 
contributions to NATO have not only been the provision of basing rights for the United 
States and NATO members, but have also included active participation in missions dating 
from the foundation of the alliance to the present. Portugal has obvious obstacles in its 
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near future to deal with, not only economically but militarily as well. How Portugal 
decides to resolve these issues will lead it into a new era, one that might involve more 
participation with the EU and less with NATO. 
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IV. MID-ATLANTIC POWER PROJECTION AND CURRENT 
REDUCTIONS AT LAJES AIR BASE 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill once wrote about World War II, “The only 
thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril.”127 This simple 
statement bore great weight on the collective minds of allied forces during the initial 
phases of World War II. The security of the Mid-Atlantic region was a vital step in 
curtailing German U-boat domination on allied naval forces. On 17 August 1943, the 
Portuguese and British governments signed an agreement authorizing Great Britain’s 
utilization of Lajes Field (located about 3,000 miles off the coast of the United States and 
900 miles from the Portuguese mainland) in support of the Allied forces at war.128 By 29 
December 1943, Lajes Field was assigned as station No. 15 of the U.S. North Atlantic 
Wing, within the Army Air Transportation.129 The steps taken by Britain and the United 
States in the Trident Conference of May 1943 solidified efforts to occupy the Azores with 
Allied forces and take Italy out of the war.130 
After World War II ended, Lajes Field Air Base flourished and became more than 
just a refueling base. By 1967 during the Cold War era, the U.S. Navy established its 
presence at Lajes Field Air Base by activating its Naval Air Facility in support of the P-3 
Orion mission of Soviet submarine detection within the region.131 
The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact signaled the 
commencement of NATO’s steps in trimming and reshaping its military presence and 
capacity for power projection within Europe and the Mid-Atlantic region. 
This chapter identifies the steps specifically taken at Lajes Field Air Base and in 
Portugal in slowly reducing U.S. military forces and capabilities, eventually getting to the 
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current state of affairs. This chapter presents a clear perspective of the limited efficacy of 
NATO’s current power projection capacity within the Mid-Atlantic area. It also discusses 
current events involving NATO and Russia, and the possibility of resurrecting the 
Alliance’s vigilance in order to safeguard the Mid-Atlantic region with renewed vigor. 
A. PORTUGAL’S ULTRAMAR WAR AND ITS IMPACT ON LAJES 
The years after World War II hardly slowed down Lajes Field Air Base and its 
multi-tier mission. Lajes had the responsibilities of refueling transient aircraft, keeping 
vigilance over a large portion of the Mid-Atlantic, and hosting a communications relay 
station as part of a global communications system. Lajes Field handles the Atlantic 
portion of secure communications, in support of the U.S. National Command 
Authority.132 Finally, Lajes Field served as an alternate landing site for NASA’s space 
shuttle, in case of a re-entry abort.133 
The American components stationed at Lajes Field Air Base were not the only 
entities empowered with important missions at that location. The Portuguese Air Force 
also had an important role at Lajes Field Air Base. The Portuguese government kept two 
fighter squadrons at Lajes Field Air Base in defense of the Portuguese Air Space for that 
region. Lisbon also established a search and rescue squadron to expedite addressing any 
emergencies at sea or on any of the nine islands within the archipelago. Finally, the 
Portuguese Air Force was and remains the sole custodian of Lajes Field Air Base’s 
physical security. One could say that Lajes Field Air Base was at the tip of the spear 
when it came to NATO’s Mid-Atlantic power projection.  
Lajes Field Air Base’s mission was not perturbed by civil unrest stemming from 
Portugal’s colonial (Ultramar) war from 1963 (the official date of the first troop  
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deployments) to 1974.134 Portugal was one of the last European countries to hesitantly 
relinquish its hold on key colonial countries with Africa and Asia. According to Michael 
Hasgor,  
The Angolan uprising started with hundreds of members of the 
Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) attacking official 
buildings in Luanda in February 1961. Uprisings followed in Guinea 
(1963) and in Mozambique (1964). The ruling Salazarists decided to not 
pull out. Their decision was not only dictated by the wish to defend vested 
interests, but it was also strongly felt that the shock of losing an empire 
would be sufficient to kill the regime, too.135 
While the Salazarist government strategized its options in preserving its colonial 
dominion and maintaining the economic advantages derived from these colonies, it was 
unknowingly engaging the wheels of change by placing Portugal’s troops and Africa-
bound immigrants in life-threatening danger. Ultimately, Portugal’s actions in the 
Ultramar war fostered a military coup, which irreversibly changed Portugal’s 
government, colonial power, and global economic status.136 
B. THE REVOLUTION OF CARNATIONS (MILITARY COUP) 
Portugal’s African wars had adverse effects on its population and influenced U.S. 
foreign policy views toward Portugal’s role in Africa. The Ultramar War was taking its 
toll on the Portuguese military. Guerrilla tactics and atrocities by both African and 
Portuguese militaries created serious doubts by Portugal’s citizens about the 
government’s ability to win the war and bring back Portugal’s military.137 Portugal’s 
influence on U.S foreign policy views in Africa allowed the war to continue. The U.S. 
support for Portugal’s efforts to keep its African colonies stemmed from an agreement to 
honor each other’s interests. The United States allowed Portugal to divert NATO- 
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assigned military equipment to the Ultramar war zone.138 In exchange, Portugal 
supported a renewal of the Lajes Field Air Base’s lease.139 According to David 
Birmingham,  
The [Portuguese] Army was re-equipped and given the budgetary 
resources to fight a major war while its officers were promoted and given 
opportunities to make private fortunes on the side while serving in the 
colonies. The officer corps was particularly sweetened by its control of the 
black market in currency which enabled a brigadier to build a high-rise 
apartment block after each tour of duty in Africa. The colonial rebels, by 
contrast, were so ferociously dragooned by the invading colonial army that 
thousands of people were killed in Angola and many more joined the 
columns of refugees who fled to Zaire.140 
In 1974, General Antonio de Spinola (a high ranking Portuguese general) 
published a book questioning the governance of Portugal, and junior officers took notice. 
Junior officers had secret meetings in the countryside, far away from the surveillance of 
the Portuguese secret police. Before dawn, on 25 April 1974, a military coup was 
initiated by taking over a radio station in Lisbon and playing a designated song, signaling 
the beginning of the coup. Portugal’s revolution was for the most part bloodless. 
Columns of tanks convoyed to Lisbon from neighboring forts. Once the tanks were in 
position and citizens heard of the coup from the radio, crowds massed by the tanks, and 
people garnished them with carnations. The Portuguese revolution brought much change 
with it, a bit more change than the United States and the other NATO Allies expected.141  
Portugal had its revolution with the assistance of the communist party. The United 
States and the rest of the NATO Allies had no interest in supporting a communist 
revolution, since their interests were already satisfied with the current regime and a 
communist government might be aligned with the Soviet Union. Inaction by the United 
States and the other NATO Allies proved to be the wrong answer. By the time Portugal 
started to establish a new government, the communist party was already in favor with 
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many of the soon-to-be governing officials of Portugal, putting the United States and 
NATO as a whole in a very uncomfortable situation.142 Scott MacDonald summed up the 
situation as follows:  
If Portugal fell to the forces of international communism, Western Europe 
would be outflanked from the rear and an important NATO member lost. 
The strategic bases in the Azores would also be lost unless a local 
conservative pro-Western separatist movement was successful in gaining 
independence.143  
At the time of the Portuguese revolution, the United States was caught unaware of 
its rapid development. The United States had no consensus on how to react to the 
Portuguese revolution. U.S. forces were already withdrawing from a failed 
democratization operation in Vietnam as well as dealing with a crippled presidency, the 
aftermath of Watergate.144 These events pushed Congress to a state of hesitance in 
dealing with international concerns, which at the time originated mostly from the Soviet 
Union.145 Nixon’s administration was followed by the Ford presidency, but the Secretary 
of State was not replaced. Henry Kissinger remained in office and managed U.S. foreign 
policy. Portugal became a hot topic for Kissinger, since Portugal’s revolution was 
surprisingly unmonitored by the U.S. administration or the U.S. Embassy in Lisbon, 
Portugal.146 Kissinger’s analysis of the situation was bleak. He saw no chance for 
Portugal to democratize.147 Kissinger went as far as replacing the U.S. Embassy’s staff in 
Portugal for recommending a passive stance on Portugal’s revolution.148 MacDonald 
elaborates on this issue as follows: 
Kissinger, according to U.S. Portuguese scholar Kenneth Maxwell, 
“abandoned hope for a democratic outcome and toyed with various 
counter-revolutionary options—some paramilitary, some involving 
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separatism in the Azores.” Kissinger had earlier likened Soares, then 
foreign minister and a leader of democratic forces, to Aleksandr Kérensky 
who failed to keep the Bolsheviks from power in Russia in 1917.149 
Fortunately, the United States and the other NATO Allies did not have to 
implement any plans of supporting Azorean separatism from mainland Portugal. 
Portugal’s voters preferred a socialist government, not a communist one, relieving U.S. 
and NATO doubts, and clearing the way to a more manageable set of relationships 
regarding shared interests.150 
The strategic value of the Azores and Portugal were clearly high for U.S. and 
NATO foreign strategy planning, to the point of having a backup plan of subverting the 
Azores’ allegiance to Portugal, in order to keep the Alliance’s strategic advantage in the 
Mid-Atlantic. The strategic priorities of the United States and NATO concerning Mid-
Atlantic power projection changed when the Cold War ended with the fall of 
Communism in Europe. 
C. INITIAL REDUCTION OF POWER PROJECTION IN THE MID-
ATLANTIC 
The period between the end of World War II and the fall of Communism in 
Europe saw many changes within the force structure at Lajes Field Air Base.151 An 
important unit established at Lajes Field Air Base was a U.S. Army Port Battalion which 
assumed its duties in 1952.152 The Port Battalion evolved to what is today called the 
Terminal Transportation Unit (TTU). The function of the TTU was to establish control 
over the loading and unloading of supplies from the local port of Praia Bay to Lajes Field 
Air Base a few miles away.153 The TTU is still functioning to this day, but in a much 
smaller capacity. In 1957, Lajes Field Air Base activated the Naval Air Facility, 
established by the U.S. Department of the Navy. This unit played an important role 
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within the base. It supported any naval aviation operations dealing directly or indirectly 
with the Azorean region, and it also set the foundation for establishing a rotational P-3 
sub-hunting mission.154 By 1967, the Lajes Naval Air Facility had the distinct mission of 
flying sorties around the Azores, utilizing the P-3 airframe over large areas of the 
Atlantic to monitor and track Soviet submarine activity. The Lajes Field Air Base 
Historian has elaborated on this issue as follows: 
The sortie rates generated by the Navy were exceeding those of the Air 
Force during the late 1960s and early 1970s as Cold War tensions flared. 
The Department of Defense made plans to transfer U.S. military command 
at Lajes from the USAF to the Navy in 1974.155  
The transition from the U.S. Air Force to the U.S. Navy never materialized due to 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, which started in October 1973.156 The Yom Kippur War was 
instrumental in keeping Lajes Field Air Base under Air Force Command. The Soviet 
Union elevated the United States interest in the Yom Kippur War when it started 
supplying the aggressors in the conflict. President Richard Nixon sided with Israel, 
putting pressure on European governments to support logistical movements of supplies 
through their bases.157 The Europeans feared retaliation from the Arab oil-producing 
nations in the form of a denial of oil supplies. Portugal was the only European country to 
fully support the United States decision, giving landing rights to Lajes Field Air Base.158 
Operation Nickel Grass was launched from Lajes Field Air Base with 136 landings and 
88 departures in the first 48 hours of the operation. At the end of Operation Nickel Grass, 
22,395 tons of cargo had passed through Lajes Field Air Base.159  
While the Navy did not take command of Lajes Field Air Base, it did continue its 
sub-hunting mission until beyond the end of the Cold War. The teardown of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989 signified the end of communism in Europe, and this brought change. Soon 
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after the end of the Cold War, the Warsaw Pact was dissolved, prompting NATO to re-
evaluate its posture within Europe.160 The United States also took a step back in its force 
projection objectives and decided that the best course of action was to reduce the size of 
its Europe-based forces, in view of the diminished threat to Europe. 
The United States Navy decided to deactivate its two naval units at Lajes Field 
Air Base by 1994.161 This reduction single handedly eliminated the monitoring and 
tracking of subs within the Azores Mid-Atlantic perimeter and essentially reduced the 
power projection capabilities of the United States and NATO. The main housing facilities 
for the P-3 Orion aircraft were demolished, leaving Lajes without any capability to house 
any aircraft.162 
Lajes Field Air Base mission with the twenty-first century fell into two major 
tasks. The first mission was to function as a fuel repository. Lajes Field still is the largest 
Air Force jet fuel repository in Europe, with a capability of storing over 65 million 
gallons of JP-8 (jet propulsion fuel) for dispersal to transient aircraft.163 Lajes Field still 
continues its secondary mission as a high frequency (HF) relay site for secure 
communications within the Atlantic region. 
D. CURRENT AND FUTURE REDUCTIONS OF POWER PROJECTION 
After the Navy’s departure in 1994, the U.S. force presence at Lajes Field 
averaged between 1,100 and 1,200 military personnel, Department of Defense civilians, 
and dependents. Lajes Field Air Base also remained an accompanied assignment. In other 
worlds, family members could accompany military personnel for the duration of their 
assignments at Lajes Field. The local national population at Lajes averaged around 800, 
not including non-appropriated funds employees. The number of such employees 
fluctuated on a monthly basis, depending on Lajes Field temporary hire contract 
expiration dates and decisions on whether to renew or pass over the contract. 
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By 2012, based on the amount of housing and military buildings vacant but 
maintained in the Lajes annual budget, the base was still postured structurally for Cold 
War era operations. Military budget constraints started to loom throughout the 
Department of Defense (DOD) and its military branches, and these cuts were eventually 
to trickle down to Lajes Field Air Base.164 On December, 13, 2012, James Townsend, the 
deputy assistant secretary of defense for European and NATO Policy, disseminated a 
press release revealing that Lajes Field Air Base was one of the designated bases to be 
reduced in force structure.165 According to Jim Garamone, 
The United States is reducing staff and operations at Lajes Field, Portugal, 
officials said today … The decision reflects U.S. operational requirements 
and is part of a DOD effort to find efficiencies and cost-cutting measures 
worldwide. There are now roughly 1,100 U.S. and Portuguese personnel at 
the base and U.S. officials say the workforce will likely shrink by at least 
half. Aircraft operations support will also drop, and the United States will 
return roughly 300 of the 400 buildings on base to the Portuguese 
government, officials said.166 
Townsend’s press release set a marker for Lajes Field Air Base’s most dramatic 
reduction.167 The press release raised many questions relevant to the impact on the 
mission of Lajes Field Air Base, the willingness of the Portuguese government to absorb 
300 structures in its already saturated housing market, and the flood of Portuguese 
civilians either retired or unemployed in Portugal’s struggling economy. These questions 
were not answered until United States Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta visited 
Portugal on 15 January 2013.168 Panetta’s visit was a sobering display of reality to 
Portugal and more importantly to the autonomous government of the Azores. In his last 
visit to Europe as Secretary of Defense to discuss NATO affairs, Panetta made it a point 
to stop in Lisbon first and discuss the military and civilian force reductions at the base, 
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personally addressing this important topic with Portugal and its people.169 Panetta 
commenced his press conference by praising Portugal for its support and contributions in 
the Afghanistan and Iraq missions, as well as Portugal’s participation in NATO’s Kosovo 
mission.170 Panetta went on to explain the United States financial challenges and how 
they pertained to the reduction of U.S. forces worldwide, not just at Lajes Field Air 
Base.171  
Panetta assured the Portuguese people that Lajes Field Air Base was still a valid 
strategic facility for the United States and NATO, and that all efforts would be made to 
mitigate the economic impact in the local region and even to strengthen military to 
military relations between the United States and Portugal.172 To quote Panetta: 
Recognizing the concerns that the [Portuguese] minister made, we have 
delayed the transition of that reduction to October of 2014. We will 
maintain, in addition, a 24/7 fire and emergency services there and we are 
committed to a 3-to-1 ratio of employees from the local community. For 
every one that the United States employs, we will employ three of the 
local community with regards to jobs.173 
While the information on the delay in transition and the 24/7 fire and emergency 
services was accurate, Secretary Panetta was mistaken on the hiring ratio of 3-to-1.174 
The original and still current ratio is 2-to-1—that is, for every United States employee 
two local nationals are employed.175 This particular subject came to the surface in several 
meetings between the Portuguese government and the Lajes Field Air Base leadership, 
but was somewhat mitigated by a clearer U.S. explanation.176 Panetta’s press conference  
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concluded with a question and answer session, which dealt with diverse aspects of 
Portugal’s role in NATO as well as United States support in transitioning Lajes Field Air 
Base to a reduced status.177 
Lajes Fiels Air Base was designated for drawdown, solely for cost-cutting 
savings, which for the Air Force amounted to $35 million annually, at a cost of a major 
reduction of personnel, facilities, and mission capacity.178 More detailed personnel 
reductions were explained at a Lajes Field Air Base town hall meeting, conducted by the 
Wing Commander, Colonel Chris Bargery, U.S. Air Force, on December 19, 2012.179 
The reduction of military personnel would leave an end strength of 170 personnel from a 
current total of 675.180 DOD civilians would be reduced to three positions from a current 
status of 98 positions.181 The local national employees would also be reduced from a 
current total of 677 to a future status of 354.182 Assignments to Lajes Field Air Base 
changed from accompanied to un-accompanied, because the base would not support the 
dependents of military personnel in future assignments.183 This would bring about a 
reduction from 600 to 800 people (depending on the size of the family) to an end state of 
zero dependents.184 
As stated by Secretary Panetta, Lajes would maintain its full capacity in two 
areas, the fire department and the joint (U.S.-Portuguese) control tower.185 A more 
significant reduction was the cutback in operational hours of Laje’s active runway. Lajes 
Field Air Base had a 24-hour / seven-days a week operational runway.186 This would be 
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reduced to an eight-hour / five-days a week schedule, severely impacting scheduling 
options for any trans-Atlantic military sortie passing through Lajes Field Air Base for 
either crew rest or refueling purposes. Emergency or priority missions would still be 
serviced by Lajes Field Air Base, but these would be few and far between.  
The reduction of forces at Lajes also led to a smaller footprint in the Portuguese 
Air Base.187 This footprint directly relates to the reduction of 300 facilities out of the 400 
designated as U.S. Forces exclusive facilities.188 As noted previously, 300 buildings 
would be given back to the Portuguese government. This issue caused a problem within 
the designated parameters of the technical agreement between the United States and 
Portugal, which directly relates to Lajes Field Air Base and all its operations. Under the 
provisions of the technical agreement any U.S. facility not needed would be offered to the 
Portuguese Air Force for its utilization.189 If the Portuguese Air Force declines to take 
over the facility, under the technical agreement, the facility in question will be 
demolished at the expense of the U.S. Air Force and the land will be restored to its 
original condition before it is given back to the Portuguese Air Force.190 If the 
Portuguese government insisted on adhering to this clause, the sheer monetary sum for 
the demolition of the buildings and the restoration of the soil would be extremely costly, 
directly eliminating and surpassing the projected annual $35 million dollar savings. 
External effects on the local government and community were not taken into 
consideration when the reduction of forces was decided.191 The local economic impact of 
families leaving—including teachers—will create a void in the local marketplace. Houses 
rented to military personnel outside the base will be reduced to zero, since the military 
workforce on Lajes Field will be living in dormitories for the 12 months assigned at Lajes 
Field. The elimination of accompanied status for Lajes Field affects the local economy. 
There will be no need for nannies, housekeepers, and gardeners, which historically 
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depended on the U.S. families for extra income. Above all, the power projection capacity 
that Lajes Field Air Base furnished from World War II to the present would practically 
disappear, sending would-be global hegemons an unintended message of weakness 
within the Mid-Atlantic region. 
Currently, Lajes Field Air Base is in holding status for its designated force 
reduction. Extensive lobbying from Luso-American congressmen and congressmen 
representing large communities of constituents of Portuguese descent introduced a 
provision in the Fiscal Year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act, to halt any 
reduction of forces at Lajes Field Air Base, until after the DOD officially briefs the U.S. 
Congress on U.S. military infrastructure consolidation plans in Europe.192 While, this 
event has not yet occurred, and Lajes Air Base remains in a waiting status of indefinite 
duration, it only stops the reduction of military members not their dependents. Lajes Field 
Air Base has been designated as an un-accompanied assignment.193 The amount of 
dependents is gradually reducing through the natural rotation of accompanied 
assignments converting to un-accompanied. 
E. TECHNICAL / LABOR AGREEMENTS, AND WORK AGREEMENT 
Shortly after the reduction of forces announcement was released in December 
2012, Lajes Field’s bilateral documents became essential sources of reference in 
determining what actions needed to be done in Lajes Field’s future. The technical 
agreement
194
 is one of the essential documents governing Lajes Field Air Base’s 
existence. The technical agreement was developed between the United States and 
Portugal, in absence of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). This document provides 
detailed information on aspects of access to the base, exclusivity of U.S. facilities, and 
the mission scope of certain resources within Lajes Field Air Base. All issues, whether  
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large or quotidian, are first referenced in this document. The scheduled reduction of 
forces at Lajes Field Air Base will considerably cut the Portuguese workforce with a 
projected cut of over 300 civilians.195 
The Labor Agreement
196
 and Work Regulation
197
 documents, produced in 
conjunction with the Technical Agreement, became important reference documents to the 
Portuguese employees. The Work Regulation is most important because it explains the 




The CRT is initially identified as a valid organization within the Labor Agreement 
document, which officially represents the best interests of the Portuguese laborers at 
Lajes Field Air Base.199 This group is not considered a union. It functions as an elected 
group of current Lajes Field Air Base Portuguese workers, which is endorsed by both the 
U.S. 65
th
 Air Base Wing Commander and the Portuguese Air Base No.4 Commander. 
The CRT voices the concerns of the Portuguese Lajes Field labor force as a whole.200 
Labor related complaints or concerns are presented to the CRT and then forwarded to 
both the U.S. and Portuguese commanders for resolution. The CRT had been disbanded 
for over seven years, before the notification of reductions at Lajes was announced, soon 
after, the CRT was revived. 
The CRT is considered an independent entity from any Lajes Field Air Base 
organization. Being independent, the committee is not limited to interactions with only 
the base’s military leadership. The CRT has been proactive in trying to mitigate the 
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projected losses Portuguese workers, by initiating talks with Azorean government 
officials, Portuguese government officials, and civilian interest groups. 
While the Labor Agreement document gives validity to the CRT, the Work 
Regulation delves deeper into the duties, rights, and responsibilities of the CRT.
201
 This 
document is invaluable in clarifying the scope of the CRT’s influence on local and 
national entities in its attempts to reverse the reduction of forces decree. The CRT has a 
prominent status within the local public eye. The efforts of this group are amplified by 
coverage of local and national media. This has at times caused public opinion to become 
skewed, since journalists have unrestricted access to the CRT but not to the U.S. 
personnel at Lajes Field Air Base. Requests from the media have to be vetted through the 
Portuguese Air Command, and are mostly denied.202 
A better understanding of Portuguese public opinion concerning U.S.–Portuguese 
relations is provided by a report entitled The U.S.—Global Leadership Project, A 
Partnership Between the Meridian International Center and Gallup.203 The Gallup report 
provides detailed data from a global international relations perspective, with the United 
States as a focal point. The report offers a global analysis of approval or disapproval of 
the U.S. government’s foreign policy performance.204 The Gallup report on Portugal 
showed a negative trend in approval of U.S. leadership decisions from 2007 to 2012. The 
highest level of approval that the Portuguese had of U.S. leadership was in 2009, 
recorded at 51 percent.205 Portugal’s approval rate for the United States dropped to 36 
percent in 2012.206 The decline in support by Portuguese citizens may influence the 
opinion of that country’s government. A low level of support for foreign military forces 
on Portuguese soil may at some point become a burden to Portugal’s sovereignty and 
weaken the alliance between the United States and Portugal. 
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The strategic value of Portugal’s Mid-Atlantic region has been recognized since 
the initial phases of World War II. The establishment of the Lajes Field Air Base by 
British and United States forces within the Azores during World War II became an 
investment that paid for itself many times over. Lajes Field Air Base has had important 
missions since its establishment. From the end of World War II to the end of the Cold 
War, Lajes Field Air Base served in a critical capacity in decisive missions around the 
world. Lajes Field Air Base also refined its missions to keep pace with modernization. It 
has been designated as a re-fueling base, a fuel repository site, an air tanker base, a 
submarine hunting base, a transitory base, a high frequency communications relay site, 
and an alternative landing site for the now defunct space shuttle, in case of launch abort. 
The strategic value of Lajes Field Air Base is undeniable to any European 
strategist. Lajes Field Air Base has reduced its forces in the past and has acquired new 
missions with new forces, but this latest proposal of reduction puts Lajes Field Air Base 
just above a mothball base (a base with minimal capacity, waiting for future activation).  
While the financial savings were eagerly compiled, it appears there was no 
political or military-operational feasibility study produced.207 Will saving $35 million 
each year guarantee the ability of Lajes Field Air Base to maintain or expand for the 
future in response to threats to the United States and NATO as a whole? If Russian 
submarines were to be active again within the Mid-Atlantic, would the Portuguese 
government allow for a new mission at Lajes Field, possibly bringing back the U.S. 
Navy’s sub-hunting mission? These questions will be especially relevant once 300 
structures have been transferred to the Portuguese government.  
The CRT brings one more layer in the preservation of the Portuguese workforce 
at Lajes, and has the workers best interests as its core mission. The CRT has been pro-
active in voicing its objection on the topic of the reduction of Portuguese jobs at Lajes, 
and has had the backing of the local and national governments.  
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The Azorean population has had a long history of immigration to the United 
States and Canada, among other countries. These immigrants have established large 
Portuguese-American communities on both coasts of the United States and Hawaii, 
generations have passed since the first immigrants from the Azores set foot on U.S. soil, 
but the Portuguese heritage has lasted the test of time. Currently, there are key U.S. 
congressmen of Portuguese descent who successfully lobbied for halting any reductions 
at Lajes Field.208 The proposal was approved in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 
2014 (H.R.3547). Lajes Field Air Base is currently in a holding pattern waiting for 
further notification of how it should proceed.209 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The future of Lajes Field Air Base is currently in a state of fluid uncertainty. What 
is certain is its past and present strategic importance, its consistent significance in 
historical mission successes, and its unwavering bond with its Portuguese community as 
witnessed by the generations of Portuguese nationals that have worked at Lajes Field Air 
Base. 
An alliance between England and Portugal started centuries before anyone in 
Europe knew that the Western hemisphere existed. This shared history became a key 
element in enabling the British to initiate their mission at Lajes Field and eventually open 
the door for the United States to become the major foreign stakeholder in strategically 
protecting this valuable territory.210 
From the end of World War II in 1945 to the end of the Cold War in 1989–1991, 
the gradual reductions in forces, as well as the changes in essential missions involving 
Lajes Field Air Base negligibly affected the functionality and importance of the Air Base. 
The first significant reduction of forces and missions at Lajes Field Air Base was 
experienced shortly after the end of the Cold War.211 The termination of the U.S. Navy’s 
submarine monitoring mission in 1994 brought with it the elimination of any permanent 
U.S. Navy presence within the Mid-Atlantic region, which reduced U.S. and NATO 
power projection capabilities within the region.212 
The U.S. Department of Defense press release concerning a substantial reduction 
of forces at Lajes Field in December 2012 raised concerns in the Portuguese and Azorean 
governments. U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta addressed Portugal’s concerns 
when he visited Lisbon a few weeks later and talked in more detail about the reduction of 
forces at Lajes Field Air Base.213 Portugal’s main concerns were the impact of the 
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reduction of Portuguese workers at Lajes Field, and the possibility of what Portugal could 
regard as the abandonment of 300 U.S. buildings without a reutilization plan.214 
An effort to mitigate economic effects had already been under way by the time 
Secretary Panetta visited Portugal. The United States European Command (EUCOM) in 
conjunction with the U.S. Embassy in Lisbon, and the U.S. Ambassador to Portugal, 
Allan Katz, coordinated a visit by the Business Executives for National Security (BENS) 
as subject matter experts in suggesting possible alternate measures to address the 
predicted negative impact of force reductions at Lajes Field on the Azorean economy.215 
The BENS findings document released on March 15, 2013 states  
BENS assembled a group of senior business leaders for this advisory visit, 
including individual experts in real estate development and management; 
residential and commercial finance; private equity, venture capital and 
investment banking; energy production; military support services; electric 
power generation and logistics.216 
The BENS visit became an important and rare opportunity for the Azorean and 
Portuguese governments to receive free business recommendations from senior 
executives with proven success. At full operational capacity, Lajes Field Air Base’s 
economic contribution to Portugal and the Azores was estimated to be between $105–150 
million per year.217 Economic revenue on Terceira Island, where Lajes Field Air Base is 
located, was estimated at 14 percent of the island’s gross domestic product (GDP).218 The 
BENS visit took the group of experts initially to Terceira Island for a visit of the primary 
area of concern, which was Lajes Field Air Base.219 The group then talked with local and 
regional government officials.220 After assessing the island’s potential, the BENS team 
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visited Lisbon and met with the U.S. Ambassador and Portuguese political and military 
leaders.221 The BENS team released its findings to the public on March 15, 2013. 
The observations made by the BENS team were based on the collective 
experience of the team’s experts. The BENS team emphasized one main area of 
expansion and profit for Terceira Island, and the team classified the opportunities into 
short and long term economic stability categories.222 Expansion of the Azorean tourism 
industry was one of the suggestions that the BENS team put in first place. The Azorean 
tourism circuit is underutilized compared to that of mainland Portugal and the Madeira 
Archipelago. The lack of support from the local and national governments makes it 
increasingly hard for tourism to flourish within the Azores Islands. A monopoly on the 
allowable air service has limited the flexibility of tourists trying to reach the Azorean 
Archipelago.223 Currently, only one airline flies between the United States and the 
Azores; and it is partially owned by the regional government, putting in question the 
willingness of the local government to share this promising business opportunity eager 
budget air carriers.224 BENS also noted the lack of expenditure on advertisements 
designed to attract tourism from the United States and Europe toward the Azores.225 
While there has been some mention of budget air carriers interested in providing 
transport to and from the Azores, no solid progress has been achieved on this issue. 
One of the important BENS recommendations to stimulate economic activity in 
the Azores was that of utilizing Terceira Island as an aircraft register.226 The BENS team 
spelled out the favorable conditions for an aircraft registry as follows:  
The business case for an aircraft registry in the Azores could emphasize 
the islands’ potentially favorable tax and fee structure, a strong customer 
orientation, a specialization in certain types of corporate or private aircraft, 
a conventional physical location, and a marketing focus on aircraft owned 
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by businesses operating in African or Asian countries having a close 
historical relationship with the Azores.227 
The BENS findings document had a few more suggestions for the Portuguese and 
Azorean governments. The BENS suggested the privatization of military housing and 
converting it to a resort or campus housing for students. It also suggested converting the 
combined middle school and high school into a university or vocational school.228 
These suggestions put forth by the BENS team have been submitted to the 
Portuguese and Azorean governments for their consideration. It would take considerable 
effort and coordination between the Portuguese and Azorean governments to take action 
on many of the suggestions put forth by the BENS team. The Portuguese government has 
concentrated its efforts on stopping or delaying the reduction of forces at Lajes Field Air 
Base, rather than engaging on the BENS suggestions. The benefits gained by 
implementing some of the BENS suggestions would be valuable for the struggling 
economy of the Azores, regardless of whether the national and local governments are 
successful in stopping the reduction of forces at Lajes Field Air Base. 
The BENS team focused solely on civilian alternatives to mitigate the economic 
impact of the reduction of forces at Lajes Field Air Base. The U.S. Air Force did not have 
any alternate measures to take into consideration other than the reduction of forces and 
the reduction on the operational window of the Lajes Field Air Base airstrip to save 35 
million dollars annually.229 
Recent events involving Russia have put into perspective the importance of being 
prepared, if necessary, to revive old Cold War countermeasures to secure the United 
States and its NATO Allies. Russia’s recent probing of Canadian, European, and U.S. 
airspace with its military aircraft has been part of an escalating show of force since 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014.230 
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Since the termination of the U.S. Navy’s submarine monitoring mission at Lajes 
Field Air Base in 1994, the Mid-Atlantic region has essentially been without surveillance 
for over two decades. The re-activation of a U.S. naval facility at Lajes Field Air Base 
would enable the United States and its NATO Allies to detect any future clandestine 
maritime movements in the Mid-Atlantic region by a foreign military establishment. The 
reintroduction of the U.S. Navy to Lajes Field Air Base would also bring a cost sharing 
factor, essentially reducing the cost burden on the Air Force. The establishment of a Navy 
mission would also bring military members back to the base, which would re-validate the 
utilization of buildings that the Air Force designated as non-essential. Military housing, 
schools, and offices could be jointly operated by the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy, 
maximizing the efficiency of the base. Lastly, the influx of a new mission at Lajes Field 
Air Base would mitigate the negative economic impact of U.S. force reductions on the 
local and national governments of Portugal. 
A re-alignment of Lajes Field Air Base to a more mission-centric major command 
could also revitalize the base’s mission to better suit its primary user. The reduction of 
forces at Lajes Field Air Base will reduce the window of operability for its runway.231 
Lajes Field Air Base currently falls under the United States Air Force Europe (USAFE) 
command. Lajes Field Air Base’s primary mission is refueling aircraft, but USAFE 
aircraft are not Lajes Field’s primary customer. The re-assignment of Lajes Field Air 
Base to the Air Combat Command (ACC) would align the base’s primary mission with 
that of its main customer, giving Lajes Field Air Base a higher priority in assessments of 
mission necessity. 
In conclusion, while one cannot predict the future, it is always prudent to err on 
the side of caution. The Azores Archipelago, Terceira Island, and Lajes Field Air Base 
have offered a strategic advantage through epic moments in history. Once the reduction 
of forces is completed, the Air Force will have to consider the reduction of its physical 
footprint on an island that has a finite quantity of land. Terceira Island measures roughly 
19 by 12 miles. Once the land the U.S. Air Force is currently utilizing is given back to the 
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Portuguese government, it will assuredly be privatized and utilized for civilian 
development. It will be either impossible or cost-prohibitive to regain any land back that 
Lajes Field Air Base requires for future missions. 
The strategic and communal bond between allies cultivated over more than 60 
years of the utilization of Lajes Field Air Base becomes a hard factor to conveniently 
omit as irrelevant in evaluating the consequences of the reduction of the base’s size and 
force. Sometimes the enduring value of a strategic asset outweighs the temporary 
budgetary constraints of a global power. 
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